@logonaut.eth
This strikes me as another sober, clear-eyed appraisal of the situation in Iran and likely outcomes of a U.S. attack:
[Foreign Policy] Why a U.S. Attack on Iran Would Backfire
❝The chances of American and perhaps Israeli airstrikes on Iran appear to be rising, ostensibly in support of the protests against the regime. U.S. President Donald Trump has been posting increasingly direct threats on social media, and administration officials are leaking copiously about their preparations. Trump appears to be overly impressed by his supposed success in Venezuela and by U.S. airstrikes last year on Iran and has always been contemptuous of experts warning of risks and consequences. Reports from outside the United States indicate that European officials have been consulted about potential targets, and some personnel have reportedly been advised to leave U.S. bases in the Gulf. None of these indicators suggests an attack is a foregone conclusion—Trump might opt for another round of sanctions and cyberattacks—but the signals are worrying.
Why would the United States bomb Iran now? It’s only partly about the protests. Israel has been agitating for another round of military action against Iran’s nuclear program—Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pressed the case with Trump during his late December meeting. But the protests, and Iran’s predictably violent repression, offer up an opportunity to act on a long-standing policy demand. Regime change in Iran has been the ultimate goal of American and Israeli hawks for decades. Many people have talked themselves into the idea that the protests have Iran’s regime on the ropes, and that it would take just a little military nudge to push it over the brink.
It’s not about promoting democracy in Iran, of course. I think we can all see exactly what Trump thinks of democracy from his actions at home and across the globe (from Venezuela to Ukraine to Denmark to the EU to Gaza). Iranians in the streets may want democracy and certainly want more than the imposition of a pro-American dictator. But Trump has no real concern for what they want, and neither do the many hawks who loudly protest their eternal love and support for the Iranian people. No matter how furious Iranians are with the Islamic Republic, a new Iranian leader arriving on the backs of American bombers will find little love among a fiercely nationalist Iranian public.
What kind of bombing might we expect? American and Israeli hawks dream of a Hezbollah-style decapitation strike that eliminates Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the senior leadership of the Islamic Republic and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). But the success of that Israeli attack in 2024, which killed Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut, is less likely to be replicated in Tehran. Iranian leaders are fully aware of the potential for such a strike. They have spent the last six months rooting out real and imagined spies and potential informants, and are unlikely to offer up an opportunity for a clean kill shot. Even if it somehow succeeded (and Israeli intelligence penetration of Iran should not be underestimated), the most likely post-Khamenei successor regime would be led by the IRGC and hard-line security forces.
Much more likely is a short to medium-length campaign to degrade the capabilities of the IRGC and the paramilitary Basij force in order to reduce the repressive capacity of the Iranian state and create an opening for protesters to overwhelm the remaining regime forces. That wouldn’t be as easy in reality as it is on social media. Regime security forces tend to be deployed where the protesters are these days. Bombing security forces will necessarily kill many protesters and scatter the rest for fear of being targeted. Another bombing run against nuclear sites may serve counterproliferation goals but won’t do much to embolden protesters. Given the tendency of Iranians to rally around the flag when bombed by the United States and Israel, the most likely effect of a non-decapitation bombing campaign would be to taper off the protests and ultimately end them.
There are also logistical issues with a sustained bombing campaign. Most American military assets are currently deployed in the Caribbean for the quixotic Venezuela campaign, leaving U.S. capabilities in the Gulf at their lowest ebb in a very long time. Supplies of missile interceptors and smart bombs are reportedly running low. And Iran is unlikely to just sit back and take it, raising the risks of a regionwide conflagration at the heart of the world’s oil production.
Nor are the Gulf states likely to take up the slack. They are, for the most part, pining for stability, not a conflict that could trigger state failure, refugee flows, and retaliatory attacks across the Gulf. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have both come out against an American attack on Iran. Riyadh shows none of the bloodlust for regime change in Iran that marked the early days of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s tenure in de facto power. The rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran brokered under Chinese auspices a few years ago continues to hold, grounded in Saudi interests in maintaining a reasonably stable environment for economic development. That’s intensified by increasingly clear Saudi concerns about an Israel unbound, not only in Gaza but in military strikes across the region. The sharp Saudi turn against the United Arab Emirates over the last month and active formation of a new military alliance encompassing Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, and some Arab states are clearly meant to balance against this perceived Israeli threat—which an attack on Iran would only exacerbate.
U.S. military action right now is unlikely to topple the Iranian regime and unlikely to protect Iranian civilians. Even if Trump’s run of good luck in his foreign-policy gambles continues and the worst potential repercussions are avoided, the strikes will likely have only a marginal direct effect. They will increase Gulf fears of Israeli expansionism, delegitimize and demobilize the protesters confronting the regime, and further normalize episodic military action without legal justification. They may also undermine global support for the sanctions that, for all the human misery they have caused, have also been a primary driver of the economic failures and state capacity degradation that triggered the protests in the first place.❞
https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/01/14/american-attack-iran-backfire-trump-protests/