Apple
A place to discuss Apple products
Pichi pfp

@pichi

I finally got to touch an iPhone Duo today. 1. I didn’t mind how big it is closed. 2. I really liked how big it is open. 3. Running 2 apps is awesome. 4. The camera is terrible. Unless it was demo mode, it’s 2-3x zoom max. Was not impressed. Since my iPhone IS my camera, I’m not sure if I could deal with that big of a downgrade. It’s really tempting to have side by side apps because I’m constantly using navigation and translation and being able to keep doing what I’m doing plus those things is a huge use case for me. It would also be nice to read and watch stuff on a bigger screen. I could see the next iteration being amazing. Not sure if I’ll buy it when I get home. I was sure I would love it from the demo but now the jury is out again.
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Kazani pfp

@kazani

"If you store your seed phrase on an old iPhone, check the model today. OneKey's founder warns that iPhone 11 and older have a chip flaw Apple can't patch. It sits in the BootROM, code burned in at the factory. What it means: - An attacker needs the phone in hand. No internet needed - Wiping the phone or using airplane mode doesn't remove it - It doesn't hand over your seed by itself. Your passcode and the Secure Enclave still stand in the way, but 6-digit PINs and short wallet passwords make attacks easier What to do: 1. Settings > General > About. iPhone 11 or older? Stop keeping seeds on it 2. Generate a NEW seed on a trusted device and move your funds. A new address under the old seed doesn't help 3. Use a long alphanumeric passcode 4. If it's been out of your hands (border check, hotel, borrowed charger), move the funds now OneKey says iPhone 12 and newer have no public BootROM exploit." https://x.com/Crypto_Jargon/status/2116827485396709544
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arob pfp

@arob1000

New work laptop, back on the Apple ecosystem after 6 years of Windows hell. Starting Monday I’ll have access to an Anthropic API key with unlimited “free” tokens. Need to level up my LLM game…
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Jarrett pfp

@jarrettr

"The touchscreen is going to make the Macbook Pro's screen gross" - guy who's Macbook keyboard looks like this
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Kazani pfp

@kazani

When you shut down a modern iPhone, the Power Management Unit (PMU) cuts voltage to the main A-series processor, the OLED display, and the camera array. It leaves a separate Low Power Mode (LPM) rail live on the motherboard. Sitting on that energized rail are three wireless chips: the Bluetooth controller, the NXP NFC controller, and the Apple U1 Ultra-Wideband chip. Apple built this hardware partition to run "Findable After Power Off," Express Transit passes, and Digital Car Keys when your battery dies. Even with iOS completely unloaded from RAM, those three chips stay powered for up to 24 hours on a manual shutdown (and up to 5 hours on automatic battery reserve). Right before iOS powers down, it pre-computes 96 rolling NIST P-224 public keys (one for every 15-minute window over the next 24 hours) and sends them to the Bluetooth chip using Host Controller Interface (HCI) commands. The final HCI command severs communication with the main processor and starts a standalone thread inside the Bluetooth silicon. While the main SoC sits unpowered, the Bluetooth chip wakes up every 2 seconds to broadcast the current P-224 public key over Bluetooth Low Energy. Any passing iPhone or MacBook that hears that broadcast encrypts its own GPS coordinates with your broadcasted public key and relays the packet to Apple servers. In 2022, researchers at the SEEMOO lab at TU Darmstadt audited this low-power hardware chain ("Evil Never Sleeps") and found a major gap between the three wireless chips. While the NFC chip runs encrypted and signed firmware and the U1 Ultra-Wideband chip checks cryptographic signatures at boot, the Broadcom Bluetooth chip has neither encryption nor signature verification on its firmware updates. Broadcom bakes its base Bluetooth firmware into read-only Mask ROM at the factory. To fix bugs and load the standalone Find My feature, iOS writes raw binary patches directly into the chip internal SRAM using a mechanism called PatchRAM (Write_RAM HCI commands). The hardware never checks a cryptographic signature on those RAM patches. If an attacker already has kernel-level code execution on iOS (through spyware or a local jailbreak exploit), they can overwrite the Bluetooth chip PatchRAM in SRAM before the user powers the phone down. When the user drags the power-off slider, iOS halts and wipes main system RAM. Because the PMU keeps the LPM power rail alive, the modified Bluetooth firmware stays in SRAM and keeps executing on reserve battery power. Worse, the TU Darmstadt team showed from iPhone board schematics that the Bluetooth and U1 chips are wired directly to the Secure Element inside the NFC controller via dedicated hardware buses (SE_I2C and R1_WAKE/SYNC) so car keys and transit cards work while the phone is off. Compromised Bluetooth firmware running in LPM can broadcast custom tracking beacons, listen for over-the-air wake commands, or talk directly to the Secure Element over SE_I2C while the main operating system is dead. Apple lets you tap "Temporarily Turn Off Finding" on the shutdown screen and enter your passcode to disable LPM for that power cycle. That toggle works if your phone is clean, because a clean iOS kernel tells the PMU to cut the LPM rail. If your phone is already compromised by kernel spyware, the malware controls the shutdown sequence. It can turn off the screen, play the shutdown animation, ignore your toggle, and tell the PMU to keep the patched Bluetooth chip powered in the background. Once kernel malware can hide inside unverified radio SRAM, a software power-off slider means nothing. Until the battery is physically disconnected from the board or the phone goes inside an RF-shielded Faraday bag, the Bluetooth silicon can stay on the air. Credit: cKure
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Kazani pfp

@kazani

"Today, we hacked what we'd set out to hack: the iPhone." https://blog.calif.io/p/iphone
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Andrea pfp

@andreaboi.eth

A modern motherboard for iPods https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xwB0ohq2xYk https://certainthings.studio/sprout/
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jd 🌺 pfp

@jdl

me, dad, and steve
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Kazani pfp

@kazani

/privacy Two-Tier Encryption in the UK: Alice and Bill have identical Apple devices. Only one gets Apple’s strongest iCloud protection. https://macanorak.com/two-tier-encryption-in-the-uk/
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Kazani pfp

@kazani

macOS 27: Workaround to avoid downloading AI models and save storage https://www.reddit.com/r/MacOSBeta/comments/1vlnf13/workaround_to_avoid_downloading_ai_models_and/
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arob pfp

@arob1000

Just “went viral” on Reddit with an Apple Watch Ultra 4 review, not sure why…too bad Reddit isn’t monetized. Watch is pretty sweet
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C. Leovido 🍃🟡 pfp

@leovido.eth

This is why the iPhone 12 and 13 mini were great. They fit perfectly in your hand. Bigger doesn't usually mean better. It's just impractical and even easier to get stolen too. A smaller device just makes more sense. Look at the older Nokia phones.
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Kazani pfp

@kazani

Apple wants the iPhone to prove a photo is real https://security.apple.com/blog/apple-reference-image/ "Reference Image" the new camera mode on the iPhone 18 Pro signs pixels directly within the sensor to combat AI-generated composites. However, its weak point emerges precisely in the photographs that matter most. Apple has detailed on its security blog how "Reference Image" works; it is an optional mode debuting on the main cameras of the iPhone 18 Pro and iPhone 18 Pro Max. Its goal is to prove that an image has neither been generated nor retouched using AI at a time when simply looking like a photograph no longer proves anything. In doing so, the company is distancing itself from the C2PA standard used by Nikon, Sony, Leica, Adobe, and Google (on the Pixel 10). According to Apple, that system adds provenance data after capture, leaving it vulnerable to undetected tampering.
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Andrea pfp

@andreaboi.eth

Design your iPhone 😂 https://neal.fun/design-the-next-iphone/
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jd 🌺 pfp

@jdl

the net effect of yesterday is we want a z fold more than we did last week
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