Dan Romero pfp
Dan Romero
@dwr.eth
A MVNO not on T-Mobile that used Passkeys for 2FA and the only way to legitimately port a SIM off the service requires a scheduled in-person interview would be a solid business. No marketing, all word of mouth from VIPs.
6 replies
3 recasts
39 reactions

dinislam pfp
dinislam
@dinislam.eth
Would you pay $5k/year for this?
1 reply
0 recast
1 reaction

Edmund Edgar (goat/acc) pfp
Edmund Edgar (goat/acc)
@edmundedgar.eth
Does that actually work? Like if you're an MVNO aren't you basically just reselling the product of the actual network operator so they can still rug your users?
1 reply
0 recast
0 reaction

horsefacts pfp
horsefacts
@horsefacts.eth
I have seen Efani recommended by a few people in the crypto security community recently (like @zachxbt here). I haven't used it and can't vouch but I think it's basically what you describe. https://twitter.com/zachxbt/status/1743115285148885489
1 reply
0 recast
2 reactions

vrypan |--o--| pfp
vrypan |--o--|
@vrypan.eth
SIMs need an onchain component that will allow users to use multisig recovery, easy portability, etc.
0 reply
0 recast
1 reaction

boscolo.eth pfp
boscolo.eth
@boscolo.eth
It is NOT possible to secure any SIM-based telephony system against number porting. One layer up from such an MVNO is an aggregator with humans that can be bribed to change the routing for that number. The solution is to upgrade the telephony network with e2ee and the mobile number secured using ENS and a private key.
1 reply
0 recast
0 reaction

w3tester pfp
w3tester
@w3tester
The problem could be easily solved with a signature from SEC the entity. Like so by valid3.id. === https://sign.valid3.id/#/hsHSD6P0
0 reply
0 recast
0 reaction