Here is a quick overview of EIPs that promote validator consolidation, before ACDC!
The fast finality roadmap requires consolidation, to allow more stake to weigh in on consensus decisions with less overhead. We therefore wish to nudge stakers in this direction.
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🧵 Introducing EIP-7999: Unified multidimensional fee market.
Ethereum is like a supermarket with one inventory label. There are 45M eggs, 45M cheese, 45M snacks, etc, but everything scans as ‘1 food.’ To avoid empty shelves, it closes once 45M “food” has been sold during the day.
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✨ The Glamsterdam equation ✨
I provide mathematical models that can be used to analyze scaling and utility of delayed execution and ePBS in the context of shorter slot times. Plots illustrate the effects of different assumptions and optimizations.
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Apples of the Infinite Garden: A Children's Book on EIP-7918
Audrey the Auctioneer, Pontus the Ponderer and Therese the Tree Tender have started an apple orchard in a huge garden. The friends have a vision: feeding the world with apples. Let's follow them on their journey 🧵👇
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Q&A 🧵 on EIP-7918
This thread summarizes my responses on Ethereum Magicians to four questions from @dataalways concerning: the coupling of fee markets, alternative designs, a comparison with EIP-7762, and the empirical impact of a price floor for blobs. Let’s dig in 👇
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Check out EIP-7918: Blob base fee bounded by execution cost. PFI in Fusaka. A simple if-else ensures the price for target blobs > the tx price to carry them. The blob auction can then reach equilibrium relative to the price signal.
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This post proposes a mechanism for users to protect their txs against MEV extraction. Users encrypt and decrypt their txs without intermediaries using a simple cryptographic hash, trustlessly achieving an encrypted mempool.
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🧵 Rainbow roles & incentives: ABPS + FOCILR + AS
This post explores the limits of a maximally unbundled staking set, examining potential rainbow roles and the incentive designs required to coordinate them. It presents three unbundling mechanisms:
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In Orbit SSF, validators rotate based on size, leading larger validators to take on greater risks. We must therefore provide some incentives to ensure consolidation in the staking set. This post offers a framework for designing such incentives.
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My talk from Devcon on a Practical endgame on issuance policy is now up. I review the motivations, impacts and potential downsides of a reduction in issuance.
This thread will visualize an automated gradual reduction in issuance, which I suggested in an answer at the end.
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Here is rough draft of how we can design consolidation incentives in Orbit SSF. Publishing it now since I will briefly refer to it during my talk at Devcon tomorrow.
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Practical endgame on issuance policy
This post presents a practical endgame on issuance policy that can stop the growth in stake while guaranteeing proper consensus incentives and providing positive regular rewards to diligent small solo stakers.
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Vorbit SSF with circular and spiral finality: validator selection and distribution
This post analyzes how cumulative finality accrues across committees in single-slot finality (SSF) for a wide range of validator sets, with a key focus on committee design.
ethresear.ch/t/vorbit-ssf......
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I wish to highlight is how to present yield distributions for non-pooled stakers. Some webpages and researchers rely on things like the median across all validators over some minuscule time period, averaging these medians over time. This fails to capture the probabilistic outcome facing the solo staker. Half of the val...
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