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1/3 - The Abandonment of Binational Palestine: An Examination of Policy Reversal, 1947-1949
Note before getting started: The language presented in this paper reflects the terms used in that era which may be offensive to some readers. For historical correctness, I chose to stick with the terms to get the point across.
Abstract
This research paper examines the significant shift in Anglo-American policy regarding Palestine between 1947 and 1949. Initially, both the administrations of President Harry Truman and Prime Minister Clement Attlee demonstrated support for binational solutions that aimed to secure equal rights for both Palestinians and Jews. However, this stance was ultimately abandoned under sustained pressure from various sources. This study analyses declassified documents and contemporary accounts to investigate the mechanisms through which organised efforts influenced official policy, including appeals to electoral concerns, financial considerations, and political maneuvering.
Introduction
Declassified historical records indicate that President Truman and British Prime Minister Attlee initially favored binational arrangements for Palestine rather than the creation of an exclusively Jewish state, intending to ensure equitable rights for all inhabitants. Their subsequent deviation from this position represents a pivotal policy reversal in modern diplomatic history, with enduring implications for stability in the Middle East.
Truman’s Initial Vision and Subsequent Policy Shift
The President’s Original Stance
Historical scholarship suggests that "as president, Truman initially opposed the creation of a Jewish state. Instead, he tried to promote an Arab-Jewish federation or binational state." This alignment was consistent with foundational American principles of democracy and self-determination, echoing concepts found in Wilson’s Fourteen Points and Roosevelt’s Atlantic Charter, which emphasised democratic governance.
Truman’s approach sought to balance the humanitarian needs of Jewish refugees with the established rights of Palestinians. When the concept of partition became unavoidable, his initial support leaned towards plans that would proportionally divide Palestine based on existing demographics, aiming to provide fair representation for Palestinians within their historic homeland.
Factors Influencing the Policy Shift
Truman himself described the pressure exerted on the White House as unprecedented. This multifaceted influence campaign appears to have involved several coordinated elements:
Financial and Electoral Considerations
Reports suggest that Postmaster General Hannegan informed Defense Secretary James Forrestal that "very large sums were obtained a year ago from Jewish contributors" and that policy "would have a very great influence on raising funds for the Democratic National Committee." Between 1947 and 1948, the White House experienced a substantial communication influx regarding Palestine, including 48,600 telegrams, 790,575 cards, and 81,200 other pieces of mail, indicating a concerted public pressure campaign. Former Undersecretary Sumner Wells stated that "by direct order of the White House, every form of pressure, direct or indirect, was brought to bear by American officials" to secure the partition vote, even in the face of State Department opposition.
Interpersonal Dynamics and Persuasion
Accounts suggest that White House advisor David Niles and others reportedly "burst into tears whenever [Truman] tried to talk to them about Palestine," a tactic that reportedly "disconcerted" the President. Niles is also noted to have "threatened emotionally to resign unless Truman acted more emphatically in support of the Jewish cause."
Administrative and Media Dynamics
Democratic officials expressed concerns about potential losses of Jewish electoral support, and significant financial contributors reportedly threatened to withdraw funding. Campaign strategists reportedly considered advertising campaigns against Democratic politicians who did not align with Zionist demands. Professionals within the State Department who advocated for binational solutions faced systematic career challenges and public criticism, sometimes characterised as anti-Semitic. Coordinated media efforts reportedly framed any support for Palestinian rights as prejudice, thereby potentially constraining open policy discussions regarding alternative democratic structures.
Truman’s Eventual Endorsement and Subsequent Reservations

Under sustained pressure, Truman reluctantly endorsed the partition plan, though he reportedly maintained private reservations. He later conveyed his frustration, writing to a Democratic National Committee official that "the situation is insoluble in my opinion."
Even upon recognising Israel, Truman demonstrated a continued reluctance toward ethnic exclusivity by personally removing characterisations of the new state as specifically "Jewish." He subsequently urged Israeli leadership to engage in negotiations with Palestinians regarding borders and the refugee situation, expressing concern about the handling of the refugee crisis.
British Support for Inclusive Solutions
The Attlee Government’s Position
The British Labour government's opposition to ethnic partition was rooted in both strategic analysis and democratic principles. "The British, who held a colonial mandate for Palestine until May 1948, opposed both the creation of a Jewish state and an Arab state in Palestine as well as unlimited immigration of Jewish refugees to the region."
Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin's stance reflected a careful assessment of regional implications. "He opposed the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine because he was convinced it would have a damaging effect on relations with the Muslims in the Middle East and India as well as affecting Britain’s extensive interests in the region."
The Anglo-American Committee’s Recommendation
Professional analysis supported binational approaches. The Anglo-American Committee unanimously concluded "that there be no Arab or Jewish state" but rather joint governance arrangements that respected the rights of both communities. This consensus reflected the views of career diplomats and regional experts from both governments.
Predictive Assessments
British officials accurately anticipated the potential consequences of ethnic partition. Bevin’s warnings regarding regional destabilisation and the potential for Palestinian displacement proved accurate, as subsequent decades illustrated the inherent instability of exclusivist arrangements.

Mechanisms of Policy Reversal
The shift in official policy appears to have been significantly influenced by financial pressure and the systematic circumvention of professional expertise.

Financial and Political Influence
In 1947, American Zionist organisations reportedly raised $150 million, at the time, the largest charitable appeal in American history, with half of these funds allocated for operations in Palestine. This capital likely facilitated extensive lobbying, electoral pressure, and media campaigns.
Professional Disregard and Intimidation
Career diplomatic and military professionals who advocated for binational solutions reportedly faced systematic intimidation. Defense Secretary James Forrestal is noted to have stated he would "rather lose those states in a national election than run the risks" of abandoning principled Middle East policy. His resistance is said to have contributed to his political marginalisation.
State Department specialists on the Middle East, whose expertise provided insight into regional dynamics, reportedly found their assessments dismissed and their careers threatened when they championed Palestinian rights or cautioned against the implications of partition. Reports suggest a "State Department rebellion," where the department was "openly in rebellion against the President. They considered him an accidental president who had no chance whatsoever of being elected again in 1948. They had no respect for him and his views." The State Department reportedly even prepared a speech to be delivered without Truman’s knowledge, which would have withdrawn support for partition and advocated for a trusteeship.
The Retreat from Trusteeship
When partition proved immediately disruptive, both governments briefly considered reverting to UN trusteeship arrangements designed to protect all communities. However, pressure from Zionist groups reportedly led to the abandonment of even these compromise positions, resulting in a unilateral Israeli declaration of independence and immediate American recognition.
Hidden Details of Influence: "Under the Cover" Operations
Beyond the publicly observable pressures, declassified documents reveal additional, less visible aspects of the influence campaign.
The Inner Circle Dynamics
- David Niles: Identified as a Jewish White House advisor, reportedly linked to Soviet intelligence according to Venona documents. He is noted for coordinating with Jewish Agency officials on "how to penetrate the policy making establishment and neutralise State Department opposition."
- Eddie Jacobson: His involvement was reportedly coordinated by B’nai B’rith leaders Frank Goldman and Dewey Stone. The sequence involved Stone spending a day with Chaim Weizmann in NYC, then confiding in Goldman that night. Goldman then contacted Jacobson in Kansas City, who subsequently traveled to Washington D.C. without an appointment and gained entry to the White House. 1 reply
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2/3 - Abraham Feinberg: Described as a significant, less visible influence in Truman’s 1948 campaign. He is credited with providing emergency funding that reportedly saved Truman’s "whistle-stop" campaign from "certain defeat" and was reportedly in secret coordination with Israeli officials on strategy. Feinberg later became a clandestine fundraiser for the Israeli nuclear weapons program and had FBI files documenting meetings with Israeli intelligence agents. He was reportedly ordered to register as a foreign agent but avoided this by ceasing the publication of his organisation.
Allegations of Arms Smuggling
Feinberg was reportedly deeply involved in a large-scale arms smuggling operation, led by Rudolph Sonneborn. This operation allegedly involved the acquisition and illicit transfer of WWII surplus weapons, in contravention of the Neutrality Act. When individuals connected to this network were apprehended, the Israeli Embassy reportedly contacted Feinberg to "intercede with U.S. Government officials," leading to their successful avoidance of imprisonment.
Covert Coordination
Clark Clifford reportedly held a dual role, simultaneously advising Truman while assisting the Jewish Agency in drafting their formal request for recognition, effectively coordinating both sides of the exchange. Moshe Shertok (later Sharett) "was frequently in Washington consulting with American Zionists as to what steps should be taken to lobby Truman."
These documented details suggest a sophisticated, coordinated, and impactful operation that extended beyond conventional lobbying. It appears to have involved financial leverage, electoral threats, appeals to emotion, alleged arms smuggling, potential foreign intelligence connections, and a systematic sidestepping of professional diplomatic expertise.
Consequences of the Policy Reversal
Palestinian Displacement
The abandonment of binational solutions is associated with significant consequences for Palestinians. Over half of the Palestinian population was displaced during the 1948 conflict, leading to a refugee crisis that continues to this day. The nature of this displacement reflects the inherent instability of ethnically exclusive arrangements, which both Truman and Attlee had initially sought to avoid.
Regional Instability
The establishment of an ethnically exclusive state has been followed by the regional instability that British strategists had predicted. Subsequent decades have witnessed multiple conflicts, chronic instability, the rise of extremist movements, and ongoing challenges to Palestinian rights, all outcomes linked to the departure from democratic, binational alternatives.
Precedents for Policy Influence
The successful shift in Anglo-American policy appears to have set precedents for the influence of specific interest groups on democratic institutions. The pattern of organised pressure potentially overriding national interests and democratic principles has been cited as a template for subsequent foreign policy dynamics.
Historical Context and Contemporary Implications
Narrative Divergence: Contemporary historical narratives that portray Truman as an enthusiastic proponent of Zionism often do not fully account for documented evidence of his initial opposition and persistent reservations. This divergence in historical interpretation may contribute to legitimising policies that emerged from processes where democratic mechanisms were reportedly bypassed.
Enduring Policy Effects: The precedents established between 1947 and 1949 continue to influence American foreign policy, with organised pressure often being a significant factor that can at times overshadow broader national interests and democratic values in Middle East policy.
Human Cost: The historical abandonment of a binational Palestine continues to contribute to ongoing conflict with global implications. The ethnic exclusivism institutionalised in 1948 has been associated with systematic human rights challenges, regional conflicts, and international instability that affects global security and energy supplies.
Conclusion
The events of 1947-1949 illustrate how sustained, organised pressure can significantly influence democratic institutions and leadership. Both Harry Truman and Clement Attlee initially approached Palestine with visions of binational arrangements that aimed to respect the rights of all inhabitants while providing refuge for Holocaust survivors.
Their eventual departure from these principles, under coordinated pressure, has had consequences that continue to impact the stability of the Middle East. The creation of an ethnically exclusive state, a path reportedly contrary to American democratic principles and British strategic interests, established precedents for the influence of specific interests on foreign policy that remain relevant in contemporary governance.
Understanding this historical context is crucial for analysing the dynamics of foreign policy decision-making, addressing the ongoing Palestinian situation, and potentially mitigating similar instances where principled governance may be challenged. The abandonment of a binational Palestine represents not only a historical event but also an ongoing issue with implications for democratic governance.
The documented evidence suggests that viable, democratic alternatives existed but were reportedly systematically undermined by organised pressure campaigns that prioritised specific interests over broader national interests, democratic principles, and regional stability. Re-examining this historical period provides essential context for understanding contemporary Middle East dynamics and for considering potential solutions rooted in principles of equal rights rather than ethnic exclusivity.
This analysis draws upon declassified documents from the Truman Library, British National Archives, and contemporary diplomatic correspondence to reconstruct the policy reversal concerning binational solutions for Palestine in favor of ethnic partition. 1 reply
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