Moving without voting

By Arjan | TPG - That Poetry Guy

Since 2008 I have moved 6 times, every time crossing a country border, although we stayed within the European Union. Everytime we settled into a new place, we also connected with some of the locals. Some families had lived in places for generations. Obviously, apart from ourselves, we also met many people who had migrated to another place. Sometimes within the country they already lived in, sometimes crossing a border. People who have been voting with their feet, so to say. Not a single one of them moved because of better municipal public services or taxes. No one. Not a single soul. They all had different reasons: job opportunity, love, family. The desire to live in a rural place, or the desire to live in an Urban environment. But none specifically cited local taxes or local public services as their reason to move.

So, when Farcaster announced the book club price about Tibout sorting, it surprised me. Not just because the assumption at the core of it (that people only make rational decisions based on perfect information), but certainly also the idea that the main barriers for moving had gone all disappeared: the cost of moving was said to be near to zero, and thanks to the internet, now we all have perfect information available to make our rational decisions. Well... people have shown to not be rational, but rather base their decision making on emotions. And about that perfect information we have available thanks to the internet... well, welcome to the post-truth age and misinformation. Good luck finding that perfect and also true information. It has become very hard.

This was only my gut reaction to it. So, I asked ChatGPT to help me analyse the book on Tiebout sorting. Here's what it told me.

Tiebout sorting is a fascinating idea in public economics and political economy because it offers a market-based explanation of how local governments might provide public services efficiently. It also raises some important questions about inequality, mobility, democratic accountability, and the role of government.

The central idea is relatively simple:

People effectively 'vote with their feet' by moving to the local community that offers the combination of public services, taxes, and living conditions they prefer.

The theory is attractive because it applies the logic of consumer choice and competition to local government. But its assumptions are demanding, and that is where much of the criticism comes from.

Let's work through it in four parts.

1. What is Tiebout sorting?

The theory was developed by American economist Charles Tiebout in his influential 1956 article, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.

Tiebout was addressing a problem in public economics: how can we determine people's preferences for public goods?

With private goods, consumers reveal their preferences through purchases. With public goods, this is more difficult because people can benefit without necessarily paying for them. This is known as the free-rider problem.

Tiebout's proposed solution was to consider competition between local jurisdictions.

Imagine three municipalities:

Different households have different preferences. Some prefer lower taxes, others value better schools, public transport, parks, or other local services.

If households are free to move, they can choose the municipality whose tax-and-service package best matches their preferences.

Over time, households sort themselves into municipalities according to their preferences.

The key insight is that competition between local governments can perform a function similar to competition between private firms.

Local governments have an incentive to offer attractive combinations of taxes and public services because residents can leave for another jurisdiction.

2. The assumptions behind the model

The original Tiebout model rests on a number of important assumptions. These are particularly relevant when assessing its strengths and weaknesses.

These assumptions allow the model to describe an idealised situation in which local governments compete and households select their preferred fiscal packages.

An important qualification: Tiebout did not argue that every real-world municipality operates this way. His model describes conditions under which decentralised local government could help reveal preferences for public goods.

3. The strong points of Tiebout sorting

There are several reasons why the model has been so influential.

A. It provides a solution to the preference-revelation problem

One of the most interesting contributions is that people do not necessarily need to articulate their preferences through political processes.

Instead, their residential choices reveal something about what they value.

For example, a family that moves to a municipality with higher property taxes and better-funded schools reveals, at least indirectly, that it values education enough to accept the additional cost.

This is particularly interesting from the perspective of public choice theory.

B. It encourages competition between local governments

The model suggests that local governments are not necessarily monopolistic providers of public services.

If residents can move elsewhere, municipalities must pay attention to the quality and cost of their services.

This creates incentives for:

In this sense, Tiebout introduces a form of market discipline into government.

C. It allows for diversity in public-service provision

A central government might struggle to identify a single combination of public services that satisfies everyone.

Local governments, however, can offer different combinations.

For instance, one municipality might prioritise public transport, another education, and another low taxation.

Decentralisation allows different communities to experiment with different approaches.

This is particularly relevant to the argument that local governments may be better positioned than central governments to respond to local preferences and circumstances. The OECD discusses this advantage in its analysis of decentralisation.

D. It offers a theoretical justification for fiscal decentralisation

Tiebout provides an economic rationale for assigning certain public services to local governments rather than central government.

If preferences differ geographically, decentralised provision can potentially produce a better match between local needs and local expenditure.

This is one of the reasons the model became so influential in the literature on fiscal federalism.

4. The weaknesses and criticisms

This is where things become particularly interesting. The criticisms are not simply that Tiebout's assumptions are unrealistic. Some challenge the underlying idea that residential sorting necessarily produces socially desirable outcomes.

A. The mobility assumption is unrealistic

Major limitation

The model assumes that people can move freely between municipalities.

In reality, moving involves substantial costs:

A household might strongly prefer another municipality's combination of taxes and services but simply be unable to afford to move there.

Consequently, residential location does not necessarily reveal genuine preferences. It may reveal financial capacity or constraints instead.

This is an important distinction: not choosing something is not necessarily the same as not wanting it.

B. It can generate socioeconomic segregation

Major distributional concern

This is arguably one of the most important criticisms.

Imagine a wealthy municipality that can finance excellent schools, attractive parks, and high-quality infrastructure.

Households with greater financial resources may be able to move there, whereas lower-income households cannot.

The result can be a geographical concentration of wealth and public services.

This creates a potential feedback loop:

  1. Wealthier households move into attractive municipalities.
  2. Their tax contributions help finance high-quality services.
  3. The quality of services makes the municipality more attractive.
  4. Housing demand increases, potentially raising property prices.
  5. Lower-income households find it increasingly difficult to enter.

The consequence may be unequal access to public services based on income and residential location.

Research by Bayer and McMillan (2012) examines precisely the relationship between Tiebout sorting, housing characteristics, and neighbourhood stratification.

An important conceptual problem emerges here:

The model may produce efficient sorting in an economic sense while simultaneously producing outcomes that are undesirable from an equity perspective.

Efficiency and equality are not the same thing.

C. It overlooks externalities and spillover effects

Important theoretical limitation

Tiebout's model assumes that local public goods primarily benefit residents of the municipality providing them.

But many public services have effects beyond municipal boundaries.

Consider:

A municipality investing in public transport may also benefit commuters from neighbouring municipalities.

Similarly, pollution generated in one municipality may affect residents elsewhere.

This creates a problem: the municipality making the spending decision does not necessarily account for all the costs and benefits.

The result can be underinvestment or overinvestment in particular public services.

Buchanan and Goetz (1972) were particularly influential in highlighting the efficiency problems associated with fiscal spillovers and the discrete nature of communities.

D. It assumes that people choose municipalities primarily on fiscal grounds

People do not choose where to live exclusively on the basis of taxes and public services.

They also consider:

For example, someone might live in a municipality with relatively high taxes and poor public transport because it is close to their workplace or family.

This means that observed residential patterns cannot automatically be interpreted as evidence of preferences for particular public-service packages.

The model simplifies a much more complicated decision-making process.

E. It can encourage exclusionary local policies

There is another potentially problematic consequence.

If municipalities compete to attract affluent households and maintain their fiscal position, they may have incentives to restrict access to their territory.

This can occur through:

In economic terms, municipalities may try to attract desirable taxpayers while limiting the costs associated with providing services to additional residents.

This creates an interesting paradox: competition between local governments can encourage efficiency, but it can also encourage exclusion.

F. It does not adequately address redistribution

The original model is concerned primarily with efficiency and the allocation of local public goods.

It does not provide a satisfactory account of how society should redistribute resources between wealthy and poorer households or municipalities.

If each municipality finances its services primarily through its own tax base, poorer municipalities may struggle to provide services of comparable quality.

This raises a fundamental question:

Should access to essential public services depend on the municipality in which someone can afford to live?

This is one reason why real-world systems of fiscal decentralisation often combine local autonomy with central government transfers and minimum service standards.

5. What does the empirical evidence tell us?

An important distinction is that Tiebout sorting is both a theoretical model and an empirical hypothesis. Evidence that people move in response to local taxes and services does not necessarily establish that the resulting allocation is efficient.

The empirical literature offers a mixed picture.

Three contributions are particularly interesting:

The broader lesson is that residential sorting does occur, but it is difficult to establish that it operates according to the idealised mechanism Tiebout describes.

In particular, people may sort according to income, employment opportunities and housing affordability rather than simply according to their preferences for public goods.

6. An additional criticism: the tension between 'exit' and 'voice'

I think this is worth considering separately because it introduces an interesting political dimension.

Tiebout's model emphasises exit: dissatisfied residents can leave a municipality.

However, democratic systems also rely on voice: citizens expressing dissatisfaction and attempting to change government policy through elections, participation and political engagement.

These two mechanisms are not necessarily equivalent.

Consider two situations:

The first is an individual response. The second is a collective political response.

There are reasons to question whether exit is always desirable.

If dissatisfied, politically engaged or financially mobile residents simply leave, the municipality may lose people who could otherwise have contributed to improving its institutions.

Furthermore, those who cannot afford to leave are left with fewer options.

This suggests that Tiebout sorting may explain one mechanism of political accountability without necessarily providing a complete account of democratic accountability.

The distinction between exit and voice is also relevant to broader discussions of decentralisation and local democracy.

7. Summary: strong versus weak points

Here is how I would organise the arguments if you were preparing an academic discussion or critical assessment.

8. My overall assessment: where is the real theoretical contribution?

I would distinguish between three different claims that are sometimes conflated.

First: residential sorting exists.

This is a relatively straightforward proposition. People do consider local taxes, services and amenities when deciding where to live.

Second: residential sorting improves the efficiency of local government.

This is a more demanding proposition. It requires that mobility, competition and local fiscal arrangements work sufficiently well to align public-service provision with residents' preferences.

Third: residential sorting produces socially desirable outcomes.

This is the most controversial proposition. Even if sorting improves allocative efficiency, it does not follow that it produces fair outcomes in terms of access to education, housing, infrastructure or other public services.

I think this distinction is crucial.

The most interesting criticism of Tiebout is not necessarily that the model is unrealistic. Economic models routinely employ simplifying assumptions.

Rather, it is that the very mechanism that potentially generates efficiency can also generate inequality and exclusion.

A system in which people can choose their preferred local public-service package may work particularly well for those who have sufficient financial resources and mobility. But it may work considerably less well for people whose residential choices are constrained.

There is therefore a fundamental tension between the efficiency argument for decentralisation and the equity argument for redistribution and universal access to public services.